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Abstract:
This paper investigates the short-run price adjustment around the acquisition announce-
ment and the long-run upward bias of the cross-sectional average buy-and-hold returns.
We apply the geometric Brownian motion model to decompose the cross-sectional ave r-
age long-run returns into mean components and volatility components. The decomposi-
tion is necessary in order to interpret security performance correctly using the measure of
wealth relatives. This procedure is useful for any studies of long-run security perform-
ance. The most surprising finding is that the long-horizon abnormal return after three
years is not significantly different from zero. This implies that the acquiring firms do not
under perform significantly compared to the market. That result stands in contrast to
findings of other studies, and it may reflect that earlier studies do not adjust for the vola-
tility component. This indicates that the market efficiency hypothesis is intact in the long
run. It is only in the very short run, i.e. a few days around the acquisition announcements,
that the market makes a significant adjustment to uphold the efficiency hypothesis.
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2I. Introduction
This paper investigates both short-run price adjustments around acquisitions and long-run
security performances following acquisitions. In the short run, the event-study methodol-
ogy provides correct and testable measurements of abnormal returns. For the long-run
returns, the problem of right-skewed buy-and-hold returns distorting the inference of se-
curity performance.
The results of the short-run analysis show that the information content from an acquisi-
tion announcement is concentrated around a small event window. The cumulative ave r-
age market model abnormal return from –15:-1 days is positive 1.5 percent and it is as-
ymptotically significant with a t-value of 2.57. For the event period +1:+15 days the cu-
mulative market model abnormal return is negative 1.2 percent and it is asymptotically
significant with a t value of -2.20. The size of the abnormal return is relatively small and
for the event time –15:+15, days the cumulative market model abnormal return is not sig-
nificant (t=0.29).
For the long run, recent studies show inference problems of long-horizon security per-
formance and test statistics. One particular problem is the right-skewed distribution of
long-run returns. Barber & Lyon (1997) and Kothari & Warner (1997) point out severe
problems that relate to the fact that the abnormal returns after a period of time become
right skewed, which implies that the long-run returns are non-normally distributed. Fama
(1998) argues that these problems are more serious with long-term returns because the
errors in expected returns grow faster with time than volatility. An explanation of the
3right-skewed distribution of buy-and-hold returns is that if the periodic returns are sym-
metric and independently distributed, right skewness and autocorrelation will arise in the
distribution of the accumulated buy-and-hold returns. The contribution of this paper is to
adjust the problem of right-skewed distribution of long-run returns. We apply the geo-
metric Brownian motion model to decompose the average buy-and-hold return into its
mean and noise component. Applying this method shows that the noise-adjusted abnor-
mal buy-and-hold return is insignificantly different from zero.
Long-horizon event studies, using the conventional method of arithmetic means of long-
run returns, report an abnormal price adjustment that continues several years after a cor-
porate announcement.1 For US data, Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker (1992) find that merg-
ers experience an average abnormal return of negative 10 percent over a five-year period
using a size portfolio adjusted benchmark. However, Franks, Harris & Titman (1991)
find no average abnormal return over a three-year period. However, Loughran & Vijh
(1997) find, using a buy-and-hold strategy, a negative average abnormal return compared
to matching firms over a five-year post-event period. When we apply the conventional
measure of the arithmetic means on wealth relatives, the market out performs acquisitions
firms by 25 percent after three years. However, the volatility-adjusted out performance is
merely 10 percent and insignificant after three years. In addition, we investigate for
cross-sectional changes due to acquisitions by comparing beta estimates from the market
model before and after the announcement. There is no evidence of cross-sectional struc-
                                                
1 Loughran & Ritter (1995) for initial public offerings, Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker (1992) for mergers and
acquisition firms, Ikenberry, Lakonishok & Vermaelen (1995) for share repurchases, Michaeley, Thaler &
Womach (1995) for dividend initiations and omissions, Speiss & Affleck-Graves (1995) for seasoned eq-
uity offerings, Loughran & Vijh (1997) for corporate acquisition firms, and Jakobsen & Sørensen (1998)
for initial public offerings.
4tural changes in the long-horizon performance following an acquisition. In general, our
results support Fama’s (1998) argument that the market efficiency hypothesis is intact
because anomalies from acquisition firms disappear with a change in the model used to
estimate the expected returns. The estimation methodology may be the cause of the long-
horizon anomalies.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section II provides descriptive statistics on ac-
quiring firms, their returns, and market returns. Section III describes the standard meth-
odology used in short-horizon event studies and shows features of the share price move-
ments surrounding acquisition announcements. Section IV provides the proposed meth-
odology for testing long-horizon buy-and-hold returns from wealth relatives and shows
evidence of non-significant long-horizon security performance. Section V tests for struc-
tural changes before and after firms' acquisition announcements and Section VI states
concluding comments.
II. Description of data
The data used in this study contains acquisition announcements when the acquiring firm
is from Denmark.2 The acquisitions are gathered form the monthly reports of the Copen-
hagen Stock Exchange that include acquisitions when Danish firms acquire domestic as
well as foreign firms. The announcement dates from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange are
double checked against announcement dates reported in Reuters Business Briefing. For
5each acquiring firm, the daily returns are gathered from Datastream and monthly returns
are gathered from Account Data.3 The mean returns, market-adjusted returns, and market
model returns for the portfolio of firms in our sample is described in Table I.
[INSERT TABLE I]
The first line shows the number of acquisitions. The number rose from 11 in 1993 to 40
in 1997, the last year in our sample. Our sample includes a total number of 138 acquis i-
tions. Table I presents the averages of monthly returns 6 months before and 6 months af-
ter the event month. The acquiring firms’ average return decreases after an acquisition
announcement. The 6-months average return before an acquisition is 1.73 percent, while
after the acquisition the 6-months average return decreases to 1.55 percent. Applying a
second method, the market-adjusted model, the 6-months average monthly abnormal re-
turn is calculated as tmRtRtAR ,-=  where tmR ,  is the 6-months average of the
monthly returns of the Danish Total Market Index. tR  is the 6-months equally weighted
average monthly returns of the acquiring firms. The 6-months average abnormal return
before acquisition announcements is positive whereas after the announcements the 6-
months average abnormal return is negative and the standard deviations are very high
compared to the means. A third method, the market model, calculates the abnormal return
as MARt=Rt – (a+b×Rmt), where the parameters (a,b) are estimated using the returns in a
period of 48 months before the event window. The 6-months average market model ab-
                                                                                                                                                
2 The data used in this study are an extension of the data gathered by Leyvsohn (1998). He presented us
with the list of takeover announcements. We have expanded the data to include monthly returns.
3 Account Data is a database that contains information about all firms that are listed on the Copenhagen
Stock Exchange. It contains annual reports and market information about each security.
6normal return is overall positive before and after the acquisition announcements, with the
exceptions of 1994 and 1995; however the standard deviations are still very high. The
results of Table I show that it is not possible to determine differences in the 6-months av-
erage abnormal returns before and after the acquisition announcements. Therefore, we
change the horizon for the calculation of the average by looking at the short-run, i.e. the
event window of 30 days and the long run of 36 months. The short-run effects are ana-
lyzed in section III and the long-run effects are analyzed in section IV.
III. Price movements around announcement
Empirical findings show several characteristics for acquisition firms, e.g. the sharehold-
ers of the acquired firms earn positive average abnormal returns while the shareholders of
the acquiring firms experience negative average abnormal returns (Loughran & Vijh,
1997 and Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker, 1992). Also, empirical evidence demonstrates
that a transfer of wealth occurs from acquiring shareholders to acquired shareholders (Jar-
rell, Brickley & Netter, 1988). The positive abnormal return of the shareholders of the
acquired firms, or equivalently the negative abnormal return of the shareholders of the
acquiring firms, depends on the size of the wealth transfer and the choice of the bench-
mark (reference) portfolio. The choice of the benchmark will always influence the mag-
nitude of the abnormal returns. However, in the short run, the choice of benchmark is not
so important for the measurement of the abnormal returns.
7A. Event study methodology
The methodology used to estimate the short-horizon abnormal returns is standard and
follows the method in Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay (1997). After the announcement date
is identified for an acquisition, the returns are aligned in event time, t, relative to the an-
nouncement date, t=0. The market model abnormal returns in the event-window around
the event date are calculated using the expected returns of a market model.4 The estima-
tion of the parameter vector, qi, is obtained by the ordinary least square method for the
estimation window L1=T1* – T0, where T0 is the first observation in the estimation win-
dow and T1*=T1-1 is the last observation in the estimation window. The market model
abnormal return vector for the event window is: e°i = R°i - X°iq, where ° denotes that the
vector is from the event window L2=T2 – T1, where T2 is the last observation in the event
window. Assuming N observations (events) in the event window, the Average Market-
model Abnormal Returns (AMAR) is defined as:5
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Given AMAR, consider a period in the event window in the range t1 to t2, where
T1<t1£t2£ T2. The Cumulative Average Market-model Abnormal Return (CAMAR) from
time t1 to t2 is defined as:
                                                
4 The market model is: Ri = Xiqi + ei, where Ri = [RiTo+1  .. RiT1]´ is a (L1x 1) vector of returns for firm i in
the estimation window between T0 and T1*, i.e. L1ºT1*-T0. Xi = [i,Rm] is an (L1 x 2) matrix between T0 and
T1* with a vector of ones in the first column and the value-weighted market return vector Rm = [RmTo+1  ..
RmT1]´ in the second column. qi = [ai bi] is the (2x1) parameter vector. ei =Ri - Xiqi  is the (L1 x 1) vector of
abnormal returns in the estimation window.
5 The average abnormal return is a cross-sectional mean that has the advantages that it is taken across many
observations. Therefore, potential influences from other simultaneously construed information, either firm
specific or the result of market effects, are minimized.
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An advantage of using cumulative average market model abnormal returns is that the ac-
cumulated AMARs may describe systematic deviations. Moreover, if the AMARs are
normally distributed, the CAMAR is also normally distributed which allows for standard
tests. The asymptotic test statistic of the cumulative average market model abnormal re-
turn (CAMAR) over the period t1 to t2 is standard normal distributed:
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and g  is a vector with ones in position t1 to t2 and zeros in position t1 to T1 and t2 to T2.
2ˆ
ie
s is the variance estimate of the error in the ordinary least squares and I is the identity
matrix with the dimension of (T2–T1)´(T2–T1) and *iX is the market return vector between
T1 and T2. Using this parametric test, it can be tested whether or not the event has any im-
pact or effect on the returns or the variance.6
B. Results on price movements
Table II presents the market model responses to the announcements. The cumulative ab-
normal returns are calculated over different event periods surrounding the announcement
                                                
6 Assuming identical, independently distributed (IID) returns involve some implications. Brown & Warner
(1985) point out that using daily stock returns imposes several important problems concerning non-
normality, non-synchronous trading, and variance estimation. However, using cross-sectional daily excess
returns, the mean return will converge to the normal distribution. The variance estimation adjusts for serial
9dates using the standard methodology of the market model. For a firm i, the cumulative
average market model abnormal return (CAMAR) is calculated from 15 days before an
announcement to 15 days after.
[INSERT TABLE II]
We find that the information content of acquisition announcements is concentrated
around a small event window. The CAMAR for event period (–15:-1) is positive 1.5 per-
cent and significant with a t-value of 2.57, however, the CAMAR for event period (+1:+5)
is not significant. The CAMAR for event period (+1:+15) is negative 1.2 percent and sig-
nificant with a t-value of -2.20. The size of the average market model abnormal return is
relatively small and for the event period (–15:+15) the CAMAR is not significant
(t=0.29). Overall, we identify a positive and significant cumulative average market model
abnormal return (CAMAR) before an announcement and a negative and significant
CAMAR after the announcement. The results indicate that the marketplace is positively
anticipating acquisitions, however, shortly after the announcement the market partic i-
pants realign the stock price of the acquiring firm to its magnitude of return. In line with
empirical findings7, the short-run post-event return is negative though not significant. The
common interpretation is that the price of an acquisition is an expense to the acquiring
shareholders. Using a generalized sign z-test shows that the percentage of positive
AMARs before an announcement is significant at a critical level of 10 percent. At the an-
nouncement date, the AMARs are positive and significant at a 5 percent critical level. This
may indicate optimism in the marketplace about the acquisitions but the optimism is sub-
                                                                                                                                                
dependence, cross-sectional dependence, and stationarity in the event-window (Campbell et al. 1997).
7 See Asquith (1983), Jarrell, Brickley & Netter (1988), or Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker (1992)
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sequently followed by a mean-reverting security performance, which is a pattern that is
often observed for acquisition firms (see e.g. DeBondt and Thaler (1987), Fama (1998)).
However, that pattern is not significant at any level in our sample. The next section in-
vestigates the long-run security performance of acquiring firms for up to three years.
IV. Long-horizon security performance
Several recent papers investigate problems with the design of the benchmark portfolio
and the test procedures of long-run returns.8 The problems of measuring long-run returns
can be dealt with in at least two different ways. The first approach focuses on the design
of the benchmark portfolio and the mis-specifications that arise from re-balancing biases
and new listings. The second approach focuses on the test problems due to the right-
skewed distribution of long-run returns regardless of the choice of the benchmark. The
majority of studies do not distinguish between those ways of approaching the problems
but rather treat them as one issue. For instance, the studies of Barber & Lyon (1997a and
1997b) and Kothari & Warner (1997) investigate re-balancing the benchmark portfolio to
adjust for the problems with the right-skewed distribution of the long-run returns. Barber
& Lyon (1997) argue that the mis-specification of the benchmark design causes the infer-
ence of long-horizon returns to be incorrect. Barber & Lyon (1997) also argue that it is
possible to achieve well-specified test statistics of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHAR), without adjusting for right skewness, if the benchmark consists of firms of
                                                
8 See Conrad & Kaul (1993), Barber & Lyon (1997), Canina, Michaely, Thaler, & Womack (1997),
Kothari & Warner (1997), Cowan & Sergeant (1997), Lyon, Barber & Tsai (1999).
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similar size and book-to-market ratio.9 Kothari & Warner (1997) also treats the problems
as one issue and suggest a test statistic that is derived from a bootstrapping technique us-
ing simulated generated pseudo-portfolio distributions of long-run returns. Lyon, Barber
& Tsai (1999) investigate both the re-balancing of the benchmark portfolio and the power
of different t-tests of the long-run returns. Lyon, Barber & Tsai (1999) suggest a skew-
ness-adjusted t-statistic based on the findings of Neyman and Pearson (1928) and Pearson
(1928, 1929). The suggested test statistic partly adjusts for the third moment of a skewed
distribution, and it is similar to parts of the standard asymptotic normality test of Jarque
& Bera (1980).
We focus on second approach: the issue of the right skewness problem. We treat the
problem of the long-run return performance from a statistical point of view by identifying
the distribution properties of the long-run returns of the included variables, i.e. the ac-
quiring firms and the Danish Total Market Index. We apply a two-step procedure. First,
we test the long-run returns of each of the variables for log-normality. If the long-run re-
turns of the variables do not follow log-normal distributions, we seek to form transfo r-
mations of the variables that will exhibit log-normally distributed long-run returns, e.g.
wealth relatives. Secondly, we apply the geometric Brownian motion to model the long-
run returns of the accepted combinations of variables, e.g. wealth relatives. The advan-
tages of using the Brownian motion model is that the model allows a decomposition of
the average long-run returns into mean components and volatility components.
                                                
9 Fama (1998) argues that corrections of expected returns using a matching approach based on size and
BE/ME does not limit bad-model problems. Abnormal returns vary whether matching is based on size or
size and BE/ME. Fama (1998) argues that this matching approach does not capture the cross-sectional
variation in expected returns. Therefore, a matching approach for expected returns is not a panacea for bad-
model problems in long-horizon event studies because the standard error in abnormal return increases with
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A. Buy-and-hold returns
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate buy-and-hold returns over a long horizon.
The investigation focuses on the issue of the right-skewed distribution of long-run returns
that follow a post-event period of up to three years. The problems with the design of
benchmark, e.g. re-balancing, survivalship, delisting and new listings, still exists and are
not addressed in this study. However, these problems are not essential for the contribu-
tion of this paper because the right-skewed distribution of long-run returns will still be
present regardless of the design of the benchmark.
The buy-and-hold return calculated for each acquisition, i, uses a rolling survival method
beginning the month following an acquisition. Firms are included in the sample until they
are delisted on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange or until they reach the last month that is
included in our sample.10 If an investor initially invests an amount Wi,0, the investor will
have accumulated after T months the value Wi,T:
Õ
=
+×=
T
t
tiriWTiW
1
),1(0,, [5]
where ri,t is the stochastic monthly returns of security i at the end of month t. Without loss
of generality, the initial value Wi,0 can be set equal to one and the buy-and-hold return
then becomes
                                                                                                                                                
the number of months.
10 The last month in the sample is the last month where we could gather available returns from Copenhagen
Stock Exchange.
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We calculated cross-sectional average long-run returns in three different ways. First, we
calculated a simple arithmetic mean of [6] for all of the acquisition firms and the corre-
sponding market index. Secondly, we calculated average buy-and-hold returns of wealth
relatives, where a wealth relative is defined as the ratio between two accumulated values.
Assuming that the initial wealth relative is one, i.e. ( ) 10,0, =MA WW , the wealth relative
after T months for i={1,…,138} and T={1,…,36} is:
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Finally, we calculated, what refer to as the "transformed buy-and-hold returns" (T-BHAR)
using abnormal returns from the market model. To determine the expected returns of the
market, we applied an estimation window of 48 months to estimate the necessary pa-
rameters of the market model. We defined the "transformed buy-and-hold abnormal re-
turn" as, where art = ri,t – rm,t,.: 11
( ) 1
1
1, -Õ
=
+º--
T
t
tarTmiBHART
[8]
                                                
11 The T-BHAR definition is different from the commonly used buy-and-hold abnormal return defined as
ÕÕ ==- +-+º
T
t tm
T
t tiTmi rrBHAR 1 ,1 ,, )1()1( -1.
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The advantage of the T-BHAR is that it is more likely to be log-normally distributed than
the BHAR. The BHAR at best consists of a difference between two log-normal distribu-
tions, which is not a well-defined distribution.
[INSERT TABLE III]
Table III shows the results of the long-horizon performance using all three methods. The
results using the first method (arithmetic cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns) shows that
the average buy-and-hold returns for acquiring firms and the market index is 52.7 percent
and 53.3 percent, respectively after three years. The average buy-and-hold return for ac-
quiring firms and the market index shows a different development compared to empirical
studies using data from the United States. In our sample the acquiring firms are con-
stantly under performing compared to the market index, but the under performance is
much smaller. For example, after six months the acquiring firms under-perform with 2.9
percent (1.106/1.075-1) relative to the market and after two years the under-performance
is 1.6 percent (1.458/1.435-1). In general, the standard deviations of the buy-and-hold
returns of acquisition firms are larger than the standard deviations of the market index.
For the second method (buy-and-hold returns of the wealth relatives), the three-year av-
erage buy-and-hold return of the wealth relative between the acquisition firms and the
market return is 2.4 percent. However, when the wealth relative is the market against ac-
quisition, the buy-and-hold return is 25 percent. The difference is due to Jensen's ine-
quality (see section 3.C). For the third method (T-BHAR), the average three years trans-
formed buy-and-hold abnormal return is –9.3 percent for rit – (a+b×rmt), while the oppo-
site relationship (a+b×rmt) – rit is 7 percent.
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From table III it is evident that the average buy-and-hold returns are different depending
upon the method used to calculate the abnormal returns. We investigates this further in
the next section. After comparing the realized post-acquisition cross-sectional security
performance with the findings in Ruback (1988), Magenheim & Mueller (1988), and
Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker (1992), we also identify negative long-horizon abnormal
returns. We test the mean of the negative average buy-and-hold return in section C.
B. The distribution of buy-and-hold returns
The results in table III can easy be mis-interpreted because the buy-and-hold returns of
the three different methods do not share common distribution properties. We test the dis-
tribution of the buy-and-hold returns of each method to identify log-normal distribution
properties. We find that the wealth-relative method in the spirit of Ritter (1991) and
Loughran & Ritter (1995) is the method that most likely exhibits log-normally distributed
long-run returns. In other words, the monthly returns are normally distributed and the ac-
cumulated value of wealth relatives are log-normally distributed and therefore right-
skewed. Thus the logarithm of the wealth relative is:
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The logarithmic expression [9] is transformed back to level by applying the exponential
function. This is shown in the following equations for the discrete time representation,
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and for the continuous time representation applying the geometric Brownian motion
model.
Trans-
formation
The wealth
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The T2-transformations are the reverse of the T1-transformations.12 The expressions in
continuous time enforce an explicit structure on the wealth relative measure that is de-
scribed by a geometric Brownian motion in which m and s are constants, and dZt is a
Wiener process with dZt ~N(0,dt).
C. Buy-and-Hold Returns From the Wealth Relative
Due to Jensen’s inequality, it is not possible to directly test the level of the average buy-
and-hold return, which implies that the expected level of the buy-and-hold return is not
exactly log-normally distributed. The expected average buy-and-hold return is in levels
given by the expression:13
                                                
12 The test statistics for log-normality (not reported) are based on Doornik & Hansen (1994) that adjust for
sample size. The problem is severe for the market model’s estimates of buy-and-hold returns while the buy-
and-hold returns of wealth relatives are acceptable log-normally distributed. Summarizing the probability
level of normality and corresponding chi-squared statistics for wealth relatives shows that only 8 percent of
the cross-sectional returns are rejected as log-normal distributed on a 5% critical level of significance. Test
statistics for distribution properties from the buy-and-hold abnormal returns are available from the authors.
13 The variance of the expected average buy-and-hold return in level is:
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From expression (10) it is observed that the volatility implies an upward bias on the ave r-
age wealth relative in levels. Thus, the reason for the differences in the buy-and-hold re-
turn of the wealth relatives observed in table III is caused by the volatility component. As
the volatility component inflicts an upward bias on the average buy-and-hold return we
decompose the wealth relative into its mean component and its volatility component. This
decomposition allows us to capture the feature that periodic returns (i.e. monthly) may be
symmetric and independently distributed while the buy-and-hold returns of the wealth
relatives exhibit right skewness. The geometric Brownian motion explicitly models the
mean and volatility components:
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where i = {1,…,138} and T = {1,…,36}. 
TA
M ,
m is the constant mean parameter, 
TA
M ,
s is
the constant standard deviation parameter, and dZi,t is the volatility component that fol-
lows a Wiener process. The expected change in the logarithmic relationship over the time
span dt is given by 
TA
M ,
m dt and the unexpected change is given by 
TA
M ,
s dZt. The loga-
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rithmic wealth relative, ( )ATMT WWLog , is normally distributed with mean TAM ,m ×T and
standard deviation 
TA
M ,
s × T .
D. Results of the decomposition of wealth relatives
Figure 1, panel A and panel C, show the developments in the average buy-and-hold re-
turns of the wealth relatives. Figure 1, panel B and panel D, show the decomposition of
the average buy-and-hold returns of the wealth relatives into mean components and vola-
tility components. The mean component (normalized to zero) over the time horizon T is
shown as TTJe ×,m -1, and the volatility component (also normalized to zero) over the time
horizon T is shown as TJe ×
2½s -1, where J = {M/A, A/M} and T = {1,…,36}.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
Panel A in figure 1 provides the average buy-and-hold returns of the wealth relatives
( )TATM WW ,,  and in panel B the decomposition into the mean component and the noise
component shown as TTJe ×,m -1 and TJe ×
2½s -1, respectively. The product of the non-
normalized components equals the non-normalized average buy-and-hold returns of the
wealth relatives in panel A. Panel C and panel D in figure 1 show the components of the
wealth relative, ( )TMTA WW ,, . Comparing panel B and panel D in figure 1 shows that the
volatility components are identical for wealth relatives ( )TATM WW ,,  and ( )TMTA WW ,, .
The correct inference of the abnormal buy-and-hold return is that the volatility compo-
nent must be accounted for in the reported returns. In other words, the average cross-
19
sectional buy-and-hold returns tend to under-estimate the under performance of acquisi-
tion firms.
The results show that the mean under performance of the acquiring firms relative to the
market after three years is negative 9.3 percent. Or equivalently, the results show that the
market out performs acquisition firms after three years with a positive 10.4 percent. This
out performance of 10.4 percent is very different from the 25 percent out performance
reported in table III. The difference is due to the volatility component and the difference
is exactly the upward bias. The out performance of 10.4 percent is the correct measure
while interpreting the 25 percent to be the out performance is inappropriate. The misin-
terpretation is even more pronounced when the under performance of 9.4 percent is con-
sidered because table III shows that the acquisition firms out perform the market by 2.4
percent.  Next, we test the mean components to evaluate whether the under performance
or over performance is significant.
E. Test of Expected Mean and Volatility Component
To test the estimates of the volatility-adjusted long-horizon security performance, we use
a test statistic that evaluates the buy-and-hold returns using the logarithmic of the wealth
relatives. We test the maximum likelihood estimate mj,T ×T :
 H0: mj,T×T  = 0, H1: mj,T×T  ¹ 0
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where j = {M/A, A/M} and T = {1,…36}. The tests of the maximum likelihood estimate
mj,T×T  are shown in figure 2 as 95-percent marginal confidence intervals. The tests are
marginal tests at any time horizon T, which means that the tests and confidence intervals
are calculated cross-sectionally at any point in time. The mean component is t-distributed
with N-1 degrees of freedom. The marginal confidence intervals for the volatility compo-
nent are also included in figure 2.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
The tests in figure 2, panel A and panel B, show that the mean component mj,T×T is not
significantly different from zero at a 95% level of significance. The development in the
mean component implies that the acquiring firms do not significantly under perform
when the long-horizon security performance is corrected for the upward bias from the
volatility component. Evaluating long-horizon security performance necessitates a cor-
rection for the implied upward bias that is due to the volatility component.
V. Structural changes
This section tests the market-model abnormal returns for structural changes. If a firm ac-
quires another firm it may change its risk exposure relative to the market for its existing
shareholders. Therefore, the estimates of the market-model parameters, especially the
beta coefficient, i.e. the correlation between the market and the acquiring firm, may
change. To test whether an acquiring firm exposes its shareholders to a change of risk, we
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perform a simple Chow test for structural changes. The Chow test is performed by di-
viding the sample of monthly returns into two groups, i.e. before and after the acquisition
announcements. The sum of squared residuals of the unrestricted group (the whole pe-
riod) and sum of squared residuals of the restricted group (the period before the an-
nouncements) are compared in an ordinary F statistic with 2 and n-4 degrees of freedom.
A simple Chow test is performed because it is appropriate in a linear framework as pro-
vided by the market model.
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
Figure 3 shows the results of testing the beta coefficient of the market model for struc-
tural changes for the alternative estimation windows. Three different estimation windows
are used and tested: 12 months, 24 months, and 48 months, respectively. The results in
panel A (12 months) and panel B (24 months) provide no indication of any structural
changes for the acquiring firms. When an estimation window of 48 months (panel C) is
applied a total of 20 acquiring firms actually experience a structural changes. However,
overall acquisitions made by firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange between
1993 and 1997 do not change the risk exposure for their shareholders.
VI. Conclusion
Event-study methods are commonly used to measure long-horizon security performance.
However, the right-skewed distribution of long-run buy-and-hold returns invalidates the
direct application of event study methods because of the upward bias, due to the volatility
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component, inherent in stochastic buy-and-hold returns. The right-skewed distribution of
buy-and-hold returns obscures the inference and testing of arithmetic averages of cross-
sectional long-run returns. However, if cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns can be con-
structed to be log-normally distributed, e.g. by the measure of wealth relatives, the model
of the geometric Brownian motion can be applied to the long-run returns. The geometric
Brownian motion model allows for a decomposition of any average long-run return into
two distinct effects: a mean component and a volatility component. This decomposition is
necessary for interpreting security performance when applying the wealth-relative meas-
ure. This procedure is especially useful for any studies of long-run security performance.
Using this technique we find that the market out performs the acquiring firms by 10.4
percent after three years, or equivalently, that the acquiring firms under perform the mar-
ket by 9.4 percent after three years. Our most surprising finding is that the long-horizon
abnormal return after three years is not significantly different from zero. This implies that
acquiring firms do not under perform significantly compared to the market. That result
stands in contrast to findings reported in earlier studies, and it may reflect that earlier
studies do not adjust for the volatility effect. A simple test for structural change shows
that firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange are not exposing their shareholders
to additional risk when acquiring other firms.
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Table I.  Monthly Security Performance, Average Market Adjusted
Returns and Average Market Model Returns
A total number of 138 acquisition firms are included in our sample. The sampling frequency is
monthly. The announcements are gathered from the monthly reports from Copenhagen Stock Ex-
change. The cross-sectional average return of the raw returns are calculated around the event
time, i.e. for each acquisition the average return is calculated as å ==
N
i itt
R
N
R
1
1
,  where N is
the number of acquisition firms for each year, Rit is the monthly return for acquisition at time t,
and the average monthly return is defined as å =×=
6
16
1
t t
t RR . The before averages are the last 6
observation prior to the announcement and the after averages are the 6 observations subsequent to
the announcement. The monthly abnormal returns across acquisition firms are calculated by
weighting each acquisition equally. å ==
6
16
1
t t
ARAAR , where ARt is the average abnormal re-
turn measured as ARt= Rt - Rmt. The average monthly abnormal return from the market model is
å ==
6
16
1
t t
MARAMAR , where MARt = Rt – (a+b×Rmt) and the parameters (a,b) are estimated
using the 48 monthly returns prior to the event window. Both the market adjusted and market
model uses the total market index on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The standard deviations
are shown in parentheses.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 All
Number of
Acquisition
firms
( N )
11 18 40 29 40 138
Before 0.0177 0.0392 -0.0035 0.0219 0.0247 0.0173
(0.0970) (0.1225) (0.0691) (0.0595) (0.0655) (0.0793)
Average
Raw
Returns
( tR  ) After 0.0251 -0.0042 0.0135 0.0226 0.0189 0.0155
(0.0804) (0.1192) (0.0891) (0.0644) (0.0861) (0.0882)
Before 0.0028 0.0261 -0.0048 0.0061 -0.0086 0.0010
(0.1087) (0.1350) (0.0790) (0.0640) (0.0735) (0.0876)
After -0.0063 0.0035 0.0033 -0.0024 -0.0128 -0.0029
Average
Market
adjusted
Returns
( AARt ) (0.0927) (0.1300) (0.0963) (0.0680) (0.1017) (0.0977)
Before 0.0041 0.0327 -0.0173 0.0129 0.0145 0.0066
(0.0977) (0.1226) (0.0745) (0.0586) (0.0661) (0.0813)
After 0.0121 -0.0097 -0.0002 0.0142 0.0090 0.0051
Average
Market
Model
Returns
( AMARt )
(0.0823) (0.1186) (0.0925) (0.0655) (0.0880) (0.0899)
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Table II.  Price response around the announcements.
The abnormal returns in the event-window around the event date are calculated from the expected
return using a market model. The market model is: Ri = Xiqi + ei, where Ri = [RiTo+1 .. RiT1]´ is an
(L1x 1) vector of returns for firm i in the estimation window, Xi = [i,Rm] is an (L1 x 2) matrix with
a vector of ones in the first column and the value-weighted market return vector Rm = [RmTo+1 ..
RmT1]´ in the second column. qi = [ai bi] is the (2x1) parameter vector. ei =Ri - Xiqi  is the (L1 x 1)
vector of abnormal returns in the estimation window. The estimation of the parameter vector, qi,
can be obtained by the ordinary least square method and the abnormal return vector for the event
window is; e °i = R°i - X°iq, where ° denotes that the vector is from the event window. The cumu-
lative average market model abnormal return is calculated from 15 days before the event to 15
days after. The test statistic 
5.0
5.0
5.0N
N
N
Z ×ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-=
+
 ~ N(0.1), where N+ is the number of positive
CAR and N is the number of observations is asymptotically normal distributed. The z-test is a
non-parametric test of whether the abnormal returns are positive or negative.
Event
Time
Cumulative
 Average
MAR
t-test p-value Generalized
Sign Z
p-value
-15:-1 1.459% 2.568 0.012a 1.424 0.157
-5:-1 1.207% 3.631 0.000a 1.659 0.100b
-1:+1 0.707% 2.706 0.008a 1.386 0.169
0:1 0.327% 1.543 0.126 2.020 0.046a
+1:+5 -0.125% -0.393 0.695 0.479 0.633
+1:+15 -1.223% -2.199 0.030a -0.653 0.515
-15:+15 0.402% 0.285 0.776 1.275 0.205
a,b Statistical significance in 2-tailed tests at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table III Average Cross-Sectional Buy-and-hold returns
The time horizon is three years assuming that an investor invests in an equally weighted portfolio of firms immediately after the acquisition announcement.
Wealth relatives are used to calculate buy-and-hold returns, ( )Õ= +×=
T
t titoti
rWW
1 ,,,
1 . Applied transformations are ( )ATiMTi WW ,,  and ( )MTiATi WW ,, , respectively.
Two versions of the market model are applied, the standard method where the abnormal return (1) is MARt=rit –(a+b×rmt), but also by subtraction firms-
specific return from the market return (2) MARt=(a+b×rmt)– rit. The MARt is used to calculate the transformed buy-and-hold abnormal return (T-BHAR).
Standard deviation is in parentheses.
Months N
Acquisition
Buy-and-hold return
WA,t-1
Market Index
Buy-and-hold return
WM,t-1
Wealth
Relative
( )TATM WW ,, -1
Wealth
Relative
( )TMTA WW ,, -1
T-BHAR (1)
( )Õ =
T
t t
MAR
1
-1
T-BHAR (2)
( )Õ =
T
t t
MAR
1
-1
6 122 0.075
(0.166)
0.106
(0.101)
0.048
(0.162)*
-0.023
(0.151)
0.006
(0.178)
-0.022
(0.186)
12 104 0.195
(0.299)
0.215
(0.176)
0.065
(0.247)*
-0.010
(0.230)
0.062
(0.335)
-0.061
(0.294)
18 87 0.321
(0.423)
0.340
(0.253)
0.091
(0.323)*
-0.003
(0.295)
0.099
(0.455)
-0.072
(0.407)
24 72 0.435
(0.628)
0.458
(0.305)
0.179
(0.493)*
-0.004
(0.417)
0.149
(0.632)
-0.082
(0.500)*
30 53 0.491
(0.656)*
0.524
(0.313)*
0.190
(0.525)*
0.004
(0.443)
0.119
(0.683)
-0.081
(0.570)*
36 33 0.527
(0.744)*
0.533
(0.222)*
0.250
(0.661)*
0.024
(0.542)*
0.070
(0.762)
-0.093
(0.611)
*Normal distributed. Normality Test (Doornik and Hansen 1994)
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Figure 1. The Development in the Mean Component and the Volatility Component.
The development in mean return and volatility are shown for buy-and-hold return. The development in average buy-and-hold return is shown in Panel A and
C for ( )TATM WW ,, and ( )TMTA WW ,, transformations, respectively. In panel B and D is the average components of the cross-sectional buy-and-hold return
are decomposed in a mean component, TTJe ×,m -1, and in a noise component, TTJe ×
2
,½s -1. The noise component is independent of whether ( )TATM WW ,, or
( )TMTA WW ,,  is used, and the noise component has a positive influence on the average long-horizon wealth relative performance. The average component of
the buy-and-hold return depends on the used transformation of wealth relatives.
Panel A: Average buy-and-hold returns (T1)
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Panel B: The mean and volatility components (T1)
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Panel C: Average buy-and-hold returns (T2)
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Panel D: The mean and volatility components (T2)
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Figure 2 Test of the corrected long-horizon security performance
We test the maximum likelihood estimate mj,T×T. The test is H0: mj,T ×T = 0, H1: mj,T×T  ¹ 0 where
j = {M/A, A/M} and T = {1,…36}. The maximum likelihood estimate mj,T×T and also 95 per-
cent marginal confidence intervals are shown. The mean component TTJe ×,m -1 for wealth rela-
tives and their confidence intervals are shown in panel A and B, respectively. The volatility
component TTJe ×
2
,½s -1 and its confidence intervals are shown in panel C.
Panel B. The mean component of the average BHR of wealth relatives (T2)
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Panel C: The volatility component of the average BHR of wealth relatives
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Panel A: The mean component of the average BHR of wealth relatives (T1)
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Figure 3     P-values of the Chow Test for Cross-Sectional Structural Changes
A simple Chow test is performed to test for structural changes of the beta coefficient of the
market model. For each acquiring firm, a beta estimate is calculated prior to the announce-
ment of an acquisition, and for the whole period. The Chow test tests for significant differ-
ence in the beta for the whole period compared to the pre-announcement period. The various
estimation windows are -6:+6, -12:+12, and -24:+24 months. The panels show p-values.
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